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THE NOT SO “FAIR” MARKETPLACE FAIRNESS
ACT AND THE DUE PROCESS AND COMMERCE
CLAUSE CONCERNS IT RAISES
MICHELLE CHIONCHIO
ABSTRACT
States have reacted to the rise of Internet commerce as any
governmental body would, with a “hungry eye” for increased tax
revenue. Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Quill, and constitutional limitations on state tax jurisdiction, states have developed
their own nexus statutes that run afoul of the Court’s bright-line
physical presence rule. What is more, “brick and mortar” establishments interested in “leveling the playing field” with their
high-tech competition wholeheartedly support the states in their
endeavor. In proposing the Marketplace Fairness Act (MFA), a
bill intended to restore state sovereignty regarding sales and use
tax laws, Congress too has seemingly sided with the states. The
MFA legislatively “overrules” Quill by replacing Quill’s bright-line
rule of physical presence with one of economic nexus, a proposition that neither Bellas Hess nor McIntyre stand for. As such,
the MFA raises a myriad of concerns, most notably Due Process
and Commerce Clause concerns, that if not addressed will surely
muddy the waters of an already complex tax system.
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INTRODUCTION
A significant portion of a state’s revenue comes from the collection of sales and use taxes.1 Today, forty-five states, plus the
District of Columbia, impose a sales tax on goods and certain
services purchased within the state.2 In addition to implementing a statewide sales tax, thirty-eight states have municipalities
that impose a local-level sales tax.3 The combined result can be
financially burdensome on consumers, causing them to forum
shop or to buy products online.4 This has created a problem in
itself. As more retailers look to the Internet to conduct their
financial transactions, the question of whether these retailers
could, or should, be forced to collect a sales tax on their transactions becomes increasingly relevant.5
This question hinges on the concept of nexus. The United
States Constitution, specifically the Due Process Clause and
Commerce Clause, imposes limitations on state tax jurisdiction,6
so that only retailers with the requisite nexus, or relationship, to
the taxing state could be taxed or forced to collect a tax.7 For Due
Process, the general inquiry is whether “some definite link, some
minimum connection”8 exists between a retailer and the taxing
Liz Malm & Ellen Kant, The Sources of State and Local Tax Revenues, TAX
FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/article/sources-state-and-local
-tax-revenues [https://perma.cc/BM8K-FJUC].
2 Geoffrey E. Weyl, Quibbling with Quill: Are States Powerless in Enforcing
Sales and Use Tax-Related Obligations on Out-of-State Retailers?, 117 PENN ST.
L. REV. 253, 256–57 (2012). The five states that do not impose a statewide
sales tax are: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon.
However, Alaska and Montana charge local-level sales tax. Scott Drenkard &
Jared Walczak, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2015, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 8,
2015), http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-and-local-sales-tax-rates-2015 [https://
perma.cc/2PTF-EDAL].
3 Drenkard & Walczak, supra note 2.
4 Moderately low state sales tax rates could result in high combined state and
local rates, compared with states that implement only a statewide rate. Id.
5 Steven C. Salch & Alvin L. Thomas, II, Taxation of Internet Services and
Transactions—A Few ‘FAQS,’ 34 HOUSTON LAW., 33, 33–37 (Sept.–Oct. 1996).
6 Id. at 34.
7 William L.S. Rowe & Emily J. Winbigler, Constitutional Issues in State
Taxation, 2 (2016). In general, “nexus” is a jurisdictional concept. It refers to
the connection between a state and an individual that gives the state the
authority to tax. Id.
8 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (quoting Miller
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)).
1
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state, and whether “… the state has given anything for which it can
ask return.”9 For the Commerce Clause, the general inquiry is
whether a tax burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce, one of the defining factors being whether a “substantial
nexus” exists between the retailer and the taxing state.10 While
“physical presence” within the taxing state indisputably satisfies
the “substantial nexus” requirement,11 exactly what in-state activities establish “physical presence” remains a point of contention,
especially for online retailers who lack offices or employees in
the taxing state.12 The Supreme Court answered this question in
its 1992, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, decision.13 There, the Court
reaffirmed the bright-line rule of National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue of Illinois,14 that “a vendor whose only
contacts with the taxing State are by mail or common carrier lacks
the ‘substantial nexus’ required by the Commerce Clause.”15
With the rise of e-commerce the “Quill standard” has been
chastised for its “artificiality;” for predicating the collection and
remittance of a state’s sales and use tax on the “[physical] presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or office.”16
Thus, states have taken it upon themselves to interpret “physical
presence” liberally, aggressively asserting nexus over remote online retailers who merely have “a web-link or banner that sits on
the website”17 of an in-state resident or company, in an attempt
to bolster their sales tax revenue.18 The result? Nexus statutes
vary from one state to the next, making it particularly burdensome
Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); Sara
Schoenfeld, Much Ado About Nexus: The States Struggle to Impose Sales Tax
Obligations on Out-of-State Sellers Engaged in E-Commerce, 24 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 263, 266 (2013).
11 Schoenfeld, supra note 10, at 266.
12 Id.
13 Quill, 504 U.S. at 298.
14 Nat’l Bellas, 386 U.S. at 753.
15 Quill, 504 U.S. at 299.
16 Id. at 315.
17 Sylvia Dion, The Marketplace Fairness Act: What All SMBs (Not Just Internet Retailers) Need to Know, ALLBUSINESS.COM (2013), https://www.allbusiness
.com/marketplace-fairness-act-what-all-smbs-need-to-know-3280-1.html [https://
perma.cc/KF49-P9AE]. Take for example, New York’s “Amazon Taxes.” Id.
18 Schoenfeld, supra note 10, at 267.
9

10

2017]

MARKETPLACE FAIRNESS ACT

347

for businesses to engage in e-commerce.19 This problem has
prompted members of Congress to propose the Marketplace Fairness Act (MFA).20 The MFA is intended to simplify “sales taxcollecting responsibility”21 and to restore the sovereign rights of the
states, by giving them the power to “compel online and catalog
retailers (remote sellers), no matter where they are located, to
collect sales tax at the time of a transaction.”22 By requiring remote
retailers to collect sales and use taxes from customers within the
taxing state, regardless of the retailers’ “physical presence” there,
the MFA legislatively “overrules” Quill.23 That is, it predicates
tax-collecting obligations on “economic nexus.”24 This Note addresses the myriad of concerns raised by the MFA, most notably
the Due Process and Commerce Clause concerns, through an
analysis of key cases. Part I of this Note provides an overview of
state and local sales and use taxes. Part II discusses the states’
response to the rise of e-commerce. Part III provides an overview
and analysis of the MFA. Part IV will discuss the Due Process and
Commerce Clause concerns raised by the MFA. Lastly, Part V
discusses the administrative concerns raised by the MFA.
I. OVERVIEW OF STATE AND LOCAL SALES AND USE TAXES
State sales taxes are a relatively new occurrence, arising
from the collapse of property tax revenues during the Great
19 Id. at 266. Online retailers must not only determine whether they have
established a nexus in the state, according to that state’s nexus requirement,
but also which of its products are subject to the state’s sales tax. Id.
20 What Is the Marketplace Fairness Act?, TAXCLOUD, http://marketplace
fairness.org/what-is-the-marketplace-fairness-act/what-is-the-MFA.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2HU6-DC2F]. The MFA was first proposed during the 112th Congress, but expired at the end of that Congress and was never enacted. A new
version of the MFA was proposed during the 113th Congress (MFA of 2013)
and the 114th Congress (MFA of 2015). PETER N. BARNES-BROWN ET AL., 1
INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:38.
21 BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4.38.
22 What Is the Marketplace Fairness Act?, supra note 20 (emphasis added);
see also Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/s698/BILLS-114s698is.pdf [https://perma.cc/
298R-2FQX].
23 Joseph Henchman, Why the Quill Physical Presence Rule Shouldn’t Go
the Way of Personal Jurisdiction, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 5, 2007), http://taxfounda
tion.org/article/why-quill-physical-presence-rule-shouldnt-go-way-personal-ju
risdiction [https://perma.cc/7EEE-PJQJ].
24 Id.
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Depression.25 Mississippi was the first state to adopt the tax, in
1930, at a rate of 2 percent.26 By 1940, twenty-two additional states
jumped on the sales tax bandwagon,27 and today, all but five
states impose a statewide sales tax.28 Furthermore, thirty-eight
states have municipalities that impose a local-level sales tax,
which is added to the rate of the statewide sales tax.29 The number of sales tax jurisdictions within these thirty-eight states varies
from state to state. For example, Texas has a total of 1,515 sales
tax jurisdictions, while Virginia has 174, and Idaho has only 9.30
Local sales tax is collected in the same manner, and at the same
time, as state sales tax.31
But what exactly is a sales tax? A sales tax is a “license or
privilege tax” imposed on individuals engaged in selling “tangible personal property” at retail, or providing a “taxable service.”32
While consumers are responsible for paying the sales tax, retailers
who have a “substantial nexus” with the taxing state are responsible for collecting and remitting that state’s sales tax.33 Thus, a
state’s power in forcing retailers to collect and remit its sales tax is
generally limited to transactions that occur within its borders.34
JOSEPH HENCHMAN, TAX FOUND., BACKGROUND PAPER NO. 69, THE MAR(2014), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org
/files/docs/TF%20BP69%20The%20Marketplace%20Fairness%20Act.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K74C-NG75].
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Drenkard & Walczak, supra note 2, at 3. The five states without a statewide sales tax are Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon;
Alaska and Montana, however, have implemented a local-level sales tax. Id.
29 Id.; William L.S. Rowe, Sales and Use Tax in Virginia, at 3 (2015).
30 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 3–4 (explaining the United States as a
whole contains 9,998 different sales tax jurisdictions).
31 Id. at 3.
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3 (as amended in 1960); Rowe, supra note 29, at 1.
33 Weyl, supra note 2, at 257; Monika Miles, Tax Nexus, TPP, Exemptions &
Other Sales Tax Terms, SALESTAXSUPPORT.COM, http://www.salestaxsupport.com
/sales-tax-information/sales-tax-101/tax-nexus-tpp-exemptions-other-sales-tax
-terms/ [https://perma.cc/HW3S-9PZ5]. Retailers with a nexus to the taxing state
are liable for “any sales tax they do not collect and may be subject to fines or
criminal penalties for non-compliance.” Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d
1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2016).
34 Weyl, supra note 2, at 257. The “negative” Commerce Clause imposes
this limit. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE TAXATION: SALES AND USE
TAXES ¶ 16.01[2] (3d ed. 2011).
25
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To cover purchases from out-of-state retailers who lack a
“substantial nexus” with the taxing state, states impose a “compensating use tax.”35 In general, an individual “using or consuming tangible personal property in [the taxing state], or storing such
property outside [the taxing state] for use or consumption within
[the taxing state], is liable for the use tax.”36 Use tax is complementary to sales tax, meaning that a customer who has paid sales tax on
a purchase is exempt from paying use tax on the same purchase.37
Use taxes, in theory, were implemented to prevent forum
shopping; the concern was that consumers, in an attempt to avoid
paying the sales tax of their state of residence, would purchase
goods from states with lower or no sales tax.38 Use taxes, however,
are limited in solving this problem because the burden of remitting the use tax is delegated to the consumer.39 Unlike sales tax,
which is collected by the retailer at the time of purchase, use tax
is “self-reported” and is paid by the consumer on his individual
tax return.40 Although failure to report is a criminal offense, most
consumers either intentionally or carelessly neglect this responsibility.41 Because these purchases occur beyond state boundaries,
Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3; Miles, supra note 33. A state’s use tax rate is
equal to its statewide sales tax rate, but local level use tax rates may vary by
jurisdiction. HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 6–7.
36 Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3; Rowe, supra note 29, at 5.
37 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 6. A sales tax is a tax on the purchase of
an item, while use tax is a tax on the use of an item. Id.
38 Id. The use tax ensures uniformity; that all tangible property that is
used or consumed within a state is subject to the same tax burden, regardless
of whether it was acquired within the state. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 735
F.3d 904, 907 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v.
Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 66 (1963)).
39 Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3. HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 7; NINA MANZI, MINN.
HOUSE RESEARCH DEPT., USE TAX COLLECTION ON INCOME TAX RETURNS IN OTHER
STATES 4 (2015), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4GB5-V4XY].
40 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 7; MANZI, supra note 39, at 4. Because of
these different reporting requirements, sales and use tax regimes “differ
greatly in effectiveness,” compliance with sales tax being “extremely high,”
and compliance with use tax being “extremely low.” Direct Mktg. Ass’n v.
Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2016). However, use tax compliance
tends to be higher in the case of “large purchases or business purchases” that
are likely to be subjected to state audit. HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 7.
41 Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 735 F.3d at 907; Weyl, supra note 2, at 258.
35
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states often have trouble collecting use taxes, resulting in a substantial loss of tax revenue.42
II. THE STATES’ RESPONSE TO THE RISE OF INTERNET COMMERCE
Americans are spending more and more on e-commerce. In
2013, Americans spent approximately $263 billion in Internet retail
purchases, which is a 15 percent increase from 2012.43 Internet
retail sales increased again in 2014 and 2015, reaching approximately $304 billion44 and $341.7 billion45 respectively. Forecasts for
2016 are likely to be equally as promising, based on the first three
quarterly reports approximating $291.7 billion46 in Internet retail
purchases. While the world of e-commerce seems to be at its peak,
growth is expected to continue for another decade.47
Weyl, supra note 2, at 258.
HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 7.
44 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CB15-20, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES
4TH QUARTER 2014 (2015), http://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical
/ecomm/14q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/96QG-UAPF]. The $304 billion figure was
adjusted for seasonal variation, but not for price changes. Id. Allison Enright,
U.S. annual e-retail sales surpass $300 billion for the first time, INTERNET
RETAILER (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.internetretailer.com/2015/02/17/us-annual
-e-retail-sales-surpass-300-billion-first-time [https://perma.cc/4RE7-UZ5Y]. 2014
marked the first year that Internet retail purchases exceeded the $300 billion
threshold. Id.
45 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CB15-20, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES
4TH QUARTER 2015 (2016), http://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical
/ecomm/15q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U5G-BZCF]. The $341.7 billion figure was
the estimated e-commerce sales for 2015. Id.
46 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CB15-133, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES
3RD QUARTER 2016 (2016), http://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf
/ec_current.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8RM-U3RH]. The $291.7 billion figure was
adjusted for seasonal variation, but not for price changes. Id.
47 See TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI E. ALLUMS, CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS § 4:2 (2012); Marc E. Babej, Forrester:
U.S. E-Commerce to Rise 13% This Year, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2013, 12:36 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcbabej/2013/03/13/forrester-u-s-e-commerce
-to-rise-13-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/K5Y3-ENNJ]. Internet sales are projected to reach $370 billion in 2017. Id. Two main drivers of growth are purported to be (1) increased investment by brick-and-mortar establishments in
their e-commerce divisions; and (2) increased time spent online, due to the
predominance of tablets and smartphones. Id. (noting that more than half of
online consumers own such devices and use them to “research products, compare prices, and make purchases.”).
42
43
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Despite the limitations imposed on state tax jurisdiction by the
Due Process and Commerce Clause, and despite the Supreme
Court’s holding in Quill, the rise of e-commerce has prompted
states to expand their nexus statutes to account for lost tax revenue on purchases from out-of-state (remote) retailers who lack
the obligation to collect and remit states’ sales and use tax. 48
This is understandable since, in today’s modern economy, many
businesses solely have a virtual presence, or have in-state physical presence (such as an office, or employees) in a minority of
states.49 Because, on average, approximately 31.3 percent of a
state’s sales tax revenue comes from the collection of sales and
use taxes,50 Quill’s bright-line “physical presence” rule has accounted for millions, if not billions, in lost sales tax revenue.51
A prime example of an aggressive nexus statute is New York’s
“Amazon Tax.”52 Essentially, New York’s law attempts to satisfy
HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 12–13.
Id.
50 CHERYL LEE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, G14-STC, STATE GOVERNMENT
TAX COLLECTIONS SUMMARY REPORT: 2014 at 1, http://www2.census.gov/govs
/statetax/G14-STC-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/93WD-EXKE]. According to the
Census Bureau’s latest data, the leading source of state tax revenue is individual income tax, at 35.9 percent; sales tax, however, is a close second, at
31.3 percent. Id. Together, sales tax and individual income tax account for
two-thirds of total tax revenue. Id. The reliance on sales tax revenue is even
starker when viewed on a state-by-state basis. For example, in 2014, Tennessee
derived approximately 79.6 percent of its tax revenue from the collection of
sales tax. Id. at 7. The rate for Texas, a state without a state income tax, is
even higher (84 percent). Id.
51 States are in a bind because they cannot require remote retailers to collect their sales tax and because use tax compliance is so low; “California, for
example, has estimated that it is able to collect only about 4% of the use taxes
due on sales from out-of-state vendors.” Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S.
Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (citing CALIF. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, REVENUE
ESTIMATE (REV. 8/13), ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND MAIL ORDER SALES 7
(2013), https://www.boe.ca.gov/legdiv/pdf/e-commerce-08-21-13F.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ATK5-TRQV] (Table 3)); HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 7–8.
52 Kenneth Corbin, New York’s About-Face on E-Commerce Taxation,
INTERNETNEWS.COM (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news
/%20article.php/3711236 [https://perma.cc/YR8N-T246]. Former Governor Eliot
Spitzer proposed the “Amazon Tax” in November 2007, which required compliance by online retailers beginning December 7, 2007; however, Spitzer
quickly rescinded the new tax policy. Id. While Spitzer did not comment on
whether potential legal challenges to the tax influenced his decision, it is
likely that Spitzer viewed the policy as “overreaching,” and “afoul of the 1992
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota.” Id. The tax
48
49
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the substantial nexus requirement by expanding the definition
of sales solicitation to include a remote retailer who “enters into
an agreement with a resident of [New York] under which the resident, for a commission or other consideration, directly or indirectly
refers potential customers, whether by a link on an internet
website or otherwise, to the seller,”53 provided that such referrals result in over $10,000 in sales per year.54 Thus, although
Amazon had no physical presence in New York,55 Amazon was required to collect and remit New York sales tax based on its marketing affiliates located in New York.56 Because Internet retailers
have a “virtual presence”57 that goes beyond state borders, New
York’s law is applicable “both to retailers that target sales to
New York residents and to retailers who sell generally to everyone on the internet, and may or may not end up selling to New
Yorkers.”58 The result, therefore, is a presumption that the remote
Internet retailer solicited sales from a resident in the taxing
state and thus satisfied the nexus requirement.59 This presumption is rebuttable, however, if the retailer can prove that “the resident with whom [he] has an agreement did not engage in any
solicitation in the state on behalf of the [retailer].”60
Undoubtedly, New York’s “Amazon Tax” runs afoul of Quill’s
bright-line physical presence rule.61 Yet, this did not stop at
least sixteen additional states from also “turn[ing] a hungry eye to
was later reconsidered and approved by the New York State Assembly on
April 9, 2008, and took effect on June 1, 2008. Cowan, infra note 56, at 1426.
53 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2010).
54 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 11.
55 Barnes, infra note 78 (Amazon’s headquarters are located in Seattle,
Washington).
56 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi); see also Daniel Tyler Cowan, New York’s
Unconstitutional Tax on the Internet: Amazon.com v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 N.C.
L. REV. 1423, 1429 (2010).
57 Cowan, supra note 56, at 1428.
58 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 11.
59 Id.; see also Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. St. Dep’t of Tax’n and Fin., 987
N.E.2d 621, 627 (N.Y. 2013) (reasoning that “it is not unreasonable to presume that affiliated website owners residing in New York State will reach out
to their New York friends, relatives and other local individuals in order to
accomplish this purpose.”).
60 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi).
61 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 11.
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the thriving e-commerce market”62 and enacting “click-through,”
“affiliate,”63 and comparable nexus statutes.64 For example, North
Carolina,65 Rhode Island,66 Arkansas,67 Vermont,68 California,69
Georgia,70 Maine,71 and Minnesota72 have all enacted New York–
inspired nexus statutes, containing both rebuttable presumption
language and a threshold sales amount.73 Other states, such as
Connecticut,74 Illinois,75 and Texas,76 have pushed the nexus
boundaries even further by enacting statutes with an irrefutable
solicitation presumption.77 Despite the constitutionality concerns
raised by New York’s “Amazon Tax” and other “click-through” or
“affiliate” nexus statues, the Supreme Court has declined to
weigh in on the issue.78
Corbin, supra note 52.
HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 12.
64 Cowan, supra note 56, at 1429.
65 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-164.8(b)(3) (West 2009).
66 See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-18-15(a)(2) (West 2016).
67 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-110(d)–(e) (2013) (noting that this statute
was formerly located at § 26-52-117; the Arkansas Code Revision Commission
renumbered this section in order to preserve the integrity of the numbering
scheme of the subchapter).
68 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9783(b)–(c) (West 2016).
69 See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6203(c)(5) (West 2012).
70 See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-8-2(8)(M) (West 2016).
71 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1754-B(1-A)(C) (West 2014).
72 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.66(4a) (West 2014).
73 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 12–13.
74 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-407(a)(12)(L) (West 2016).
75 See 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/2 (West 2015); id. 110/2 (under “Retailer maintaining a place of business in this State,” § 1.1; and “Serviceman
maintaining a place of business in this State,” § 1.1, respectively).
76 See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.107(a)(3), (a)(8) (West 2012).
77 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 13.
78 Korey Clark, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear New York Amazon Tax
Case, LEGAL NEWSROOM (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom
/commercial/b/contracts-commercial-law/archive/2013/12/09/supreme-court-re
fuses-to-hear-new-york-amazon-tax-case.aspx [https://perma.cc/ELQ6-MNGN];
see also Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. St. Dep’t of Tax’n and Fin., 987 N.E.2d
621, 621 (N.Y. 2013); Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. St. Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 913
N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). On December 2, 2013, the U.S. Supreme
Court denied petitions for certiorari from Amazon.com and Overstock.com to
review a New York Court of Appeals judgment upholding the “Amazon Tax.”
Clark, supra. While some view the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial as approval
of New York’s “Amazon Tax,” “to treat both online and brick-and-mortar retailers
equally and fairly,” others see “[t]he failure of the [C]ourt to take … [the] case …
[as] an additional burden on interstate commerce since the line between physical
62
63
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III. THE MARKETPLACE FAIRNESS ACT
A. Overview
On November 9, 2011, the MFA was first introduced in the
Senate to restore the states’ “sovereign rights to enforce State
and local sales and use tax laws.”79 The bill does so by granting
states the authority to require all sellers exceeding $500,00080 in
total U.S. “remote sales,” to collect and remit the sales and use
tax of the states to which the sales were “sourced.”81 As defined in
the MFA, a “remote sale,” is “a sale of goods or services attributed
to a State with respect to which a seller does not have adequate
physical presence to establish a nexus under Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992),”82 and the term “sourced,” refers to
“the location where the item sold is received by the purchaser,
based on the location indicated by instructions for delivery that
the purchaser furnishes to the seller.”83 To illustrate, assume that
a New York retailer, who lacks physical presence in Pennsylvania,
sells a computer to a customer in Pennsylvania, who receives the
computer in Pennsylvania. Under the MFA, which explicitly
defies Quill’s bright-line physical presence rule, Pennsylvania is
authorized to compel the New York retailer to collect and remit
and virtual presence will only continue to blur.” Id. (quoting N.Y. State Attorney
General Eric T. Schneiderman and David C. Blum, Chicago tax attorney).
Overstock responded to the Court’s denial by suspending its relationship with
its New York affiliates so that it would not fall prey to the New York law.
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court declines case on making online retailers collect
sales taxes, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli
tics/supreme-court-declines-case-on-making-online-retailers-collect-sales-taxes
/2013/12/02/e430ec8c-55f5-11e3-835d-e7173847c7cc_story.html [https://perma
.cc/3KN6-BSWW].
79 Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. (2011), https://www.gov
track.us/congress/bills/112/s1832/text [https://perma.cc/MSV4-R87K] (the bill
was sponsored by Michael Enzi (R-WY)).
80 This is known as the “small seller exception.” Id. § 2(c); see also infra
Part IV.A.3.b.
81 S. 1832 § 2(c). The MFA treats “similar sales transactions equally, without regard to the manner in which the sale is transacted.” Id. § 2.
82 Id. § 6(5). The Supreme Court in Quill, which is still good law today, established that a State “may not require retailers who lack a physical presence
in the State to collect use taxes on behalf of the [State].” Direct Mktg. Ass’n v.
Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1127 (2015) (citing Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298, 315–18 (2002)).
83 S. 1832 § 6(8).

2017]

MARKETPLACE FAIRNESS ACT

355

the Pennsylvania sales and use tax arising from the remote sale.84
If perhaps, the customer lived in Pennsylvania but instructed
that the computer be delivered to his Connecticut home, under
the MFA, Connecticut would be authorized to compel the New
York retailer to collect and remit the applicable Connecticut
sales and use tax.85
The MFA imposes two limitations on states wishing to force
the collection and remittance of their sales and use taxes.86
First, states must agree to simplify, or streamline, their sales and
use tax laws.87 Second, sellers qualifying for the “small seller
exception” are exempt from the MFA and therefore beyond the
reach of the states.88
States wishing to streamline can do so in two ways. For one,
they can adopt the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement
(SSUTA).89 The purpose of the SSUTA is to simplify sales and
use tax administration, and thereby reduce the burden of tax
compliance,90 by essentially making the tax administration protocols identical in member states.91 SSUTA purports to do this
in the following ways:
84 See Peter G. Stathopoulos, State Taxation of Remote Sellers: Has the
Physical Presence Nexus Test been Rendered Obsolete?, J. MULTIST. TAX’N &
INCENTIVES, Aug. 2013, at 24, 24–25.
85 See generally Dion, supra note 17; BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20,
§ 4.38.
86 See BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4.38.
87 See Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011).
88 Id. § 3(c).
89 See What Is the Marketplace Fairness Act?, supra note 20; STREAMLINED
SALES & USE TAX AGREEMENT § 102 (STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING
BD., INC. 2015), http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/downloads/Archive
/SSUTA/SSUTA%20As%20Amended%20through%209-17-15.pdf [https://perma
.cc/BT2J-EHM3]. The SSUTA was adopted on November 12, 2002. Currently, 23
states are full members, while 1 state is an associate member. Full member
status is achieved when a state is in full compliance with the laws, rules,
regulations, and policies outlined in the SSUTA. Associate member status is
achieved when a state is in substantial compliance with the SSUTA as a whole,
but not necessarily with each provision. State Info: Streamline Sales Tax State
Members, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., http://www.stream
linedsales-tax.org/index.php?page=state-info [https://perma.cc/H4KJ-Q4NN].
90 STREAMLINED SALES & USE TAX AGREEMENT, supra note 89, § 102.
91 Streamlined Sales and Use Tax, SALESTAXSUPPORT.COM (2016), http://
www.salestaxsupport.com/sales-tax-information/streamlined-sales-tax-sst/
[https://perma.cc/KE4B-H4B4].
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State level administration of sales and use tax collections; uniformity in the state and local tax bases; uniformity of major
tax base definitions; central, electronic registration system for
all member states; simplification of state and local tax rates;
uniform sourcing rules for all taxable transactions; simplified
administration of exemptions; simplified tax returns; simplification of tax remittances; protection of consumer privacy. 92

Secondly, states wishing to avoid membership in the SSUTA
may still require remote sellers to collect and remit their sales
and use taxes if they implement certain minimum simplification
requirements.93 Such states must:
(A) Provide—(i) a single State-level agency to administer all
sales and use tax laws, including the collection and administration of all State and applicable locality sales and use taxes
for all sales sourced to the State made by remote sellers, (ii) a
single audit for all State and local taxing jurisdictions within
that State, and (iii) a single sales and use tax return to be used
by remote sellers and single and consolidated providers and to
be filed with the State-level agency.
(B) Provide a uniform sales and use tax base among the State
and the local taxing jurisdictions within the State.
(C) Require remote sellers and single and consolidated providers to collect sales and use taxes pursuant to the applicable
destination rate, which is the sum of the applicable State rate and
any applicable rate for the local jurisdiction into which the sale
is made.
(D) Provide—(i) adequate software and services to remote sellers
and single and consolidated providers that identifies the applicable destination rate, including the State and local sales tax rate (if
any), to be applied on sales sourced to the State, and (ii) certification procedures for both single providers and consolidated providers to make software and services available to remote sellers,
and hold such providers harmless for any errors or omissions as
a result of relying on information provided by the State.
(E) Hold remote sellers using a single or consolidated provider harmless for any errors and omissions by that provider.
(F) Relieve remote sellers from liability to the State or locality
for collection of the incorrect amount of sales or use tax, including any penalties or interest, if collection of the improper amount
is the result of relying on information provided by the State.
92
93

STREAMLINED SALES & USE TAX AGREEMENT, supra note 89, § 102.
Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. (2011).
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(G) Provide remote sellers and single and consolidated providers
with 30 days notice of a rate change by any locality in the State.94

Under the MFA’s “small seller exception,” remote sellers having “gross annual receipts” of $500,000 or less, in “total remote
sales in the United States,” are exempt from the bill.95 In determining whether this threshold has been met, “gross annual receipts” refers to the total amount the seller receives from “all
sources during its annual accounting period, without subtracting
any costs or expenses;”96 furthermore, the sales of sellers “related”
within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code § 267(b) and (c),97
or § 707(b)(1),98 are to be aggregated.99
Although the MFA expired at the end of the 112th Congress
without being enacted,100 the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015
(MFA of 2015), a nearly identical bill, was introduced to the Senate
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
96 Raul Avenir, What are Gross Receipts?, ARIZ. CENTRAL: YOUR BUSINESS,
http://yourbusiness.azcentral.com/gross-receipts-8325.html [https://perma.cc
/98PV-L6TV]; Gross Receipts Defined, IRS (Nov. 6, 2012), https://www.irs.gov
/charities-non-profits/gross-receipts-defined [https://perma.cc/K8CM-Y48W].
97 Related persons under sections 267(b) and (c) include: members of a
family (whole or half blood brothers and sisters, spouses, ancestors, and lineal descendants); a corporation and an individual who, either directly or indirectly, owns
more than 50 percent of such corporation’s outstanding stock; a parent corporation
and its subsidiary; a fiduciary and grantor of a trust; fiduciaries of two different
trusts, if the same person serves as grantor of both trusts; a fiduciary and beneficiary of a trust; a fiduciary and beneficiary of different trusts, if the same person
serves as grantor of both trusts; a fiduciary of a trust and a corporation, if the fiduciary owns, either directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the corporation’s
outstanding stock; a partnership and a corporation if the same person owns
more than 50 percent of the corporation’s outstanding stock, and more than 50
percent of the partnership’s capital or profits interests; two S corporations if
the same person owns more than 50 percent of each S corporation’s outstanding stock; and a C corporation and an S corporation, if the same person owns
more than 50 percent of each corporation’s stock. I.R.C. § 267(b)–(c) (2016).
98 Related persons under section 707(b)(1) include “a partnership and a
person owning, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the capital interest,
or the profits interest, in such partnership,” and “two partnerships in which
the same persons own, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the capital
interests or profits interests.” I.R.C. § 707(b)(1) (2012).
99 Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. § 3(c) (2011).
100 See BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4.38.
94
95
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on March 10, 2015.101 The starkest difference between the MFA
and the MFA of 2015 lies in its “small seller exception.”102 While the
MFA exempts remote sellers with gross annual receipts of $500,000
or less in total remote sales, the MFA of 2015 increased this threshold to $1,000,000 or less.103 That is, under the MFA of 2015, states
can only require remote sellers to collect and remit their sales and
use taxes if “the remote seller has gross annual receipts in total
remote sales in the United States ... exceeding $1,000,000.”104
Proponents of the MFA allege that the bill will help “level the
playing field” between remote, online sellers and local “brick and
mortar establishments,” by requiring the former to charge sales
tax on their goods.105 The argument goes as such: local store owners
are disadvantaged in that they are forced to charge sales tax on
their goods, while remote, online sellers can effectively bypass taxation by showing a lack of physical presence in the taxing state.106
Because sales tax is not a factor in their profit calculations, remote,
online sellers are able to offer goods at a lower effective price,
which, proponents claim, gives them a more competitive edge and
takes a toll on the taxing state’s finances and retail job market.107
Opponents of the MFA argue that “compel[ling] online and
catalog retailers (‘remote sellers’), no matter where they are
See Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(D)(ii)
(2015). The MFA of 2015 was sponsored by Michael Enzi (R-WY), and is the most
recent version of the bill. Id. (The MFA of 2015 is nearly identical to the original
MFA, with its revised small seller threshold as its starkest difference.) The
MFA of 2015 clarifies that nonmember SSUTA states must provide software to
remote sellers that calculates the “sales and use taxes due on each transaction at
the time the transaction is completed,” “free of charge.” Id. (emphasis added).
102 Compare Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832 § 2(c), with Marketplace
Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698 § 2(c). The MFA of 2015 now exempts remote
sellers with gross annual receipts under $1,000,000, while the original MFA
exempted sellers with gross annual receipts under $500,000. Id.
103 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698 § 2(c). This “small seller exception” is likely to be removed in future drafts of the bill because, according
to U.S. Rep. Goodlatte, “laws should be so simple and compliance so inexpensive
and reliable as to render a small business exemption unnecessary.” HENCHMAN,
supra note 25, at 17.
104 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698 § 2(c).
105 BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38.
106 See id.
107 See Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 26–27. For example, consumers often use brick and mortar retailers as product “showrooms,” to gauge prices
before ultimately purchasing the desired product from an online, remote retailer, such as Amazon.com. Id.
101
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located, to collect sales tax at the time of a transaction,”108 regardless of physical presence, amounts to “taxation without representation”109 and unduly burdens interstate commerce.110 Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady asserts that, in order for a tax to
survive a “negative” Commerce Clause challenge, it must be
“fairly related to the services provided by the state.”111 Thus, opponents argue that forcing online, remote sellers to collect and
remit sales taxes, even though they receive no benefit from the
collection and have no voice in how the tax revenue is spent,112
amounts to a Commerce Clause violation.
IV. DUE PROCESS AND COMMERCE CLAUSE CONCERNS
RAISED BY THE MFA OF 2015
A. Due Process and Commerce Clause Analysis via Quill
1. Quill, An Overview
Quill was a mail-order Delaware corporation that sold office
equipment and supplies.113 Quill had offices and warehouses in
only three states (Illinois, California, and Georgia) but solicited
What Is the Marketplace Fairness Act?, supra note 20.
BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38; see also Cassandra Carroll,
Marketplace Fairness Act Would Cripple Small Businesses, AMS. FOR TAX
REFORM (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.atr.org/marketplace-fairness-act-would
-cripple-small-businesses [http://perma.cc/EH5D-KLXZ]. This argues that the
MFA of 2013 sets a troubling example in granting states taxing power over
non-constituents: “Their ultimate goal is to export their tax and regulatory burden to Americans who have no recourse at the ballot box. A politician’s dream
come true.” Carroll, supra, at 2 (quoting Katie McAuliffe, FORBES: CAPITAL
FLOWS (Sept. 4, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/09/04
/amazon-can-support-the-internet-sales-tax-because-amazon-is-exempt/#3717a1
c5ffb0 [https://perma.cc/RN64-ZSE2]).
110 See Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 27–46.
111 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); see also
Rick Handel, A Conceptual Analysis of Nexus in State and Local Taxation, 67
TAX LAW. 623, 628 (2014).
112 BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38. Unlike remote, online retailers, local brick and mortar establishments directly benefit from the sales
tax revenue they are forced to collect and remit to the taxing state. For example, in exchange for sales tax revenue, the state provides brick and mortar
establishments with better fire and police protection, better-maintained
roads, and better-maintained public transportation systems, giving customers
greater access to these stores. Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 27–46.
113 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992).
108
109
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business from across the country via catalogues, flyers, advertisements in national periodicals and direct telemarketing.114 Quill’s
annual national sales exceeded $200 million, approximately $1
million of which came directly from sales to 3,000 North Dakota
customers.115 Quill had neither offices, nor warehouses, nor employees who worked or lived in North Dakota, and delivered its
products to North Dakota via mail or common carriers from outof-state locations.116 Yet, despite its lack of physical presence, North
Dakota attempted to compel Quill, through a cleverly worded nexus
statute,117 to collect and pay its use tax on goods purchased for
use within North Dakota.118 Quill challenged North Dakota’s statute on Due Process and Commerce Clause grounds, arguing that,
since it lacked physical presence in North Dakota, it could not be
required to serve as North Dakota’s “collection agent.”119
The trial court ruled for Quill, finding the case indistinguishable from National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
Illinois.120 In Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court held that a “seller
whose only connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by
common carrier or the United States mail”121 lacks the “substantial
nexus” required by the Commerce Clause, and therefore cannot
Id.
Id.
116 Id.
117 North Dakota amended its statutory definition of “retailer” in 1987 to
broadly include “every person who engaged in regular or systematic solicitation of
a consumer market in the state;” “regular or systematic solicitation” means
“three or more advertisements within a 12-month period.” Id. at 302–03 (emphases added). According to the statute, all “retailers” were required to collect
and remit North Dakota’s use tax, “even if they maintain[ed] no property or
personnel in North Dakota.” Id.
118 Id. at 301.
119 Id. at 303.
120 Id. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753
(1967). Like Quill in North Dakota, National Bellas Hess was a mail-order
company that solicited business from Illinois customers. Although it lacked
physical presence in Illinois—it had no place of business, no sales representatives, and no real or personal property there—Illinois required that National
Bellas Hess collect and pay its use tax on purchases made to Illinois customers. The Supreme Court ruled for National Bellas Hess, finding that a “seller
whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or
the United States mail” lacks the “substantial nexus” required by the Commerce Clause. Id. at 758.
121 Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
114
115
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be compelled to collect such state’s use taxes.122 Similarly, the
trial court in Quill concluded that, since North Dakota failed to
show that its tax revenue was spent—at least in part—to benefit
mail-order businesses, there was no “nexus to allow the state to
define retailer in the manner it chose.”123
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed on two grounds.
First, it concluded that, because of the “wholesale changes” in
the economy—most notably, the exponential growth of mail-order
businesses “from a relatively inconsequential market niche [in
1967] ... [to] a goliath” with annual sales that reached “the staggering figure of $183.3 billion in 1989”124—Bellas Hess was outdated
and was no longer appropriate to follow.125 Second, because Quill’s
“economic presence” in North Dakota depended on North Dakota’s
services and benefits, a “constitutionally sufficient nexus” had
been created, which justified the “imposition of the purely administrative duty of collecting and remitting the use tax.”126
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed.127
2. The Varying Due Process and Commerce Clause Inquiries
and Nexus Statutes
Although “closely related,”128 the Due Process Clause and the
Commerce Clause differ in several ways.129 First, they each pose
distinct limits on states’ taxing powers. Second, they each call
for different nexus requirements. Third, Congress may only authorize violations of the Commerce Clause, not violations of the
Due Process Clause.130
Quill, 504 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 303.
124 State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208–09, 213
(N.D. 1991).
125 Quill, 504 U.S. at 303.
126 Id. at 304 (quoting Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 219).
127 Id. at 319.
128 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
129 Quill, 504 U.S. at 305–06; see also Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of
Ind., 322 U.S. 340, 353 (1944) (“‘Due process’ and ‘commerce clause’ conceptions are not always sharply separable .... To some extent they overlap ....
But, though overlapping, the two conceptions are not identical. There may be
more than sufficient factual connections ... between the transaction and the
taxing state to sustain the tax as against due process objections. Yet it may
fall because of its burdening effect upon the commerce.”).
130 Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.
122
123
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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
states from depriving citizens of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”131 For state tax purposes, this requires
that there be “some definite link, some minimum connection,
between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks
to tax,”132 and that the “income attributed to the State for tax
purposes ... be rationally related to the ‘values connected with
the taxing State.’”133 Similar to adjudicative jurisdiction Due
Process inquiries,134 state tax jurisdiction Due Process inquiries
focus on an individual’s contacts with the taxing state and ensure that they are substantial enough not to “offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”135
Since Due Process analysis hinges on the “fundamental fairness of governmental activity,”136 its nexus standard, justifiably,
calls for “notice” or “fair warning,” rather than physical presence.137 Thus, a remote seller who “purposefully avails itself” of
the benefits of a state’s economic market may very well subject
itself to that state’s in personam jurisdiction, despite the seller’s
lack of physical presence there.138 Based on this reasoning, the
Supreme Court rejected Quill’s Due Process Clause challenge;
despite Quill’s lack of physical presence in North Dakota, Quill’s
commercial efforts were “continuous and widespread,” and “purposefully directed” towards North Dakotans,139 which gave Quill
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Quill, 504 U.S. at 306 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S.
340, 344–45 (1954)).
133 Quill, 504 U.S. at 306 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267,
273 (1978)) (emphasis added).
134 Michael T. Fatale, The Evolution of Due Process and State Tax Jurisdiction, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 565, 595 (2015).
135 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Quill, 504 U.S. at 307
(“All assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”).
136 Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 307–08 (“Jurisdiction ... may not be avoided merely because the
defendant did not physically enter the forum State .... [I]t is an inescapable
fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines ....”) (quoting
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
139 Id. at 308. Quill mailed twenty-four tons of catalogues and flyers into
North Dakota every year. State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d
203, 218–19 (N.D. 1991).
131
132
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“fair warning” that it may be subject to North Dakota’s jurisdiction and forced to serve as its “collection agent.”140
The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the authority
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”141 Congress may
either choose to regulate, “thereby preempting the states from
doing so ... or to authorize the states to regulate.”142 But what
happens when Congress remains silent, “neither preempting nor
consenting to state regulation,” and a state undertakes to regulate amidst Congress’s silence?143 According to the Supreme Court,
the Commerce Clause’s “negative sweep” implicitly limits the power
of state and local governments by prohibiting regulations that
discriminate against and unduly burden interstate commerce.144
For a tax to survive a “negative” Commerce Clause challenge,
it must: (1) be “applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing State”; (2) be “fairly apportioned”; (3) “not discriminate
against interstate commerce”; and (4) be “fairly related to the services provided by the State.”145 This four-part test, derived by the
Supreme Court in Complete Auto,146 helps to curb state taxing
power by prohibiting “economic protectionism” or state tax laws
designed to benefit a state’s inside economy (non-remote sellers) by
burdening its outside competitors (remote sellers).147 Thus, unlike
Due Process analysis, which focuses on the “fundamental fairness
of governmental activity,” Commerce Clause analysis focuses on
the “effects of state regulation on the national economy.”148
Because the inquiries are different, the Commerce Clause’s
“‘substantial nexus’ requirement is not, like Due Process’ ‘minimum
Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Weyl, supra note 2, at 258.
142 Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1135 (10th Cir. 2016).
143 Id.
144 Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)). As
suggested by Justice Johnson in Ogden, “the Commerce Clause is more than
an affirmative grant of power[.]” Id. The “negative” or “dormant” aspect of the
Commerce Clause is not explicitly stated in the Constitution—“[the Constitution] says nothing about the protection of interstate commerce in the absence
of any action by Congress”—but is derived directly from Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3. Id.
145 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); Handel,
supra note 111, at 628.
146 Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.
147 Brohl, 814 F.3d at 1135.
148 Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
140
141
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contacts’ requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather a means for
limiting state burdens on interstate commerce.”149
3. Due Process and Commerce Clause Concerns
In essence, the MFA of 2015 legislatively “overrules” Quill by
replacing the “physical presence” requirement of “substantial nexus”
with one of “economic nexus.”150 That is, a remote seller who
incurs gross annual receipts in total remote U.S. sales exceeding
$1,000,000151 is presumed to have a “substantial nexus” with all
states to which a remote sale is sourced, despite the seller’s lack
of physical presence in these states.152 Because the MFA of 2015
purports not to “create any nexus or alter the standards for determining nexus between a person and a State or locality,”153 the
rationale of the bill hinges on the idea that “economic nexus” is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause
and Commerce Clause, namely “fair warning” and “substantial
nexus.”154 However, Quill and McIntyre stand for the contrary.155
While a mere high volume of sales may mitigate Due Process concerns, it does not similarly mitigate Commerce Clause concerns.156
As iterated in Quill, for a seller to have a “substantial nexus”
with the taxing state, the seller must have a “physical presence”
there, such as the existence of employees or property;157 “economic nexus” alone is insufficient.158 Thus, although when taken
Id. at 313.
James G.S. Yang, Synchronizing the Concepts of Physical Presence and
Economic Nexus under the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, 17 6 J. INTERNET L.
21, 28 (2013).
151 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2015).
152 Id. § 2(a).
153 Id. § 3(b).
154 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
155 Id. at 312–13.
156 Id. at 308.
157 Id. at 301–02, 312–13. “Physical presence” in the taxing state does not
include the advertisements, flyers, or catalogues. Id.
158 Id. Quill Corp. lacked a “substantial nexus” with North Dakota despite
the fact that it sent 24 tons of catalogs and flyers into the State and solicited
approximately $1,000,000 in sales from 3,000 North Dakota residents each
year. Id. at 302, 304. This is because Bellas Hess created a safe harbor for sellers
“whose only connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by common
carrier or the United States mail,” freeing them “from state-imposed duties to
collect sales and use taxes.” Id. at 315 (quoting Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967)).
149
150
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at face value the MFA of 2015 purports not to create or alter the
sales and use tax nexus standards,159 it seemingly does exactly
what it purports not to do. Any other interpretation of the bill
would be inconsistent; since the bill only applies to remote
sellers,160 it is impossible for it to be effective without creating
nexus where it did not previously “legally” exist.
a. Due Process Analysis via McIntyre
Although a personal jurisdiction case, McIntyre161 is relevant to
state tax jurisdiction inquiries because “the state tax and adjudicative jurisdiction due process inquiries are ‘comparable.’”162 Further,
the constitutional limitations applicable to state tax jurisdiction
derive predominantly from the Due Process Clause.163
McIntyre concerned a New Jersey resident, Nicastro, who was
injured while using a metal-shearing machine manufactured by J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (J. McIntyre), a foreign company incorporated in England.164 The injury occurred in New Jersey and
Nicastro sued in New Jersey, claiming that J. McIntyre was
subject to New Jersey’s jurisdiction for three reasons: (1) a U.S.
distributor agreed to sell J. McIntyre’s machines in the United
States; (2) J. McIntyre officials attended trade shows in several
states, although not in New Jersey; and (3) at most four of J.
McIntyre’s machines, including the one that allegedly injured
Nicastro, ended up in New Jersey.165 Invoking Justice Brennan’s
“stream-of-commerce” test, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that New Jersey may exercise jurisdiction over J. McIntyre, a
foreign manufacturer, without offending the Due Process Clause
so long as J. McIntyre “knew or reasonably should have known”
Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 3(b) (2015)
(emphasis added).
160 Id. § 2(a). “The provisions of this Act shall apply only to remote sales
and shall not apply to intrastate sales or intrastate sourcing rules.” Id. § 3(f)
(emphasis added).
161 See generally J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
162 Fatale, supra note 134, at 595. McIntyre, which concerns “specific” rather than “general” adjudicative jurisdiction, is particularly relevant to state
tax inquiry since state tax cases consider questions of specific jurisdiction. Id.
at 568.
163 Id. at 595.
164 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 878.
165 Id.; Fatale, supra note 134, at 608–09.
159
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that its products would be distributed through a national distribution system, resulting in potential sales in any of the fifty
states.166 Finding that J. McIntyre neither had a presence nor
minimum contacts in New Jersey, the Supreme Court reversed.167
Justice Kennedy, writing for four of the Justices, held that in
order for a remote seller to be subject to New Jersey’s jurisdiction, the seller must have “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”168 Because J.
McIntyre “had no office in New Jersey; it neither paid taxes nor
owned property there; and it neither advertised in, nor sent any
employees to, the State,”169 Justice Kennedy reasoned that J.
McIntyre had not “purposefully avail[ed] itself” of New Jersey,
and, thus, could not be subject to New Jersey’s jurisdiction.170
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice Alito, agreed
with the outcome of the case, but disagreed with Justice Kennedy’s
analysis.171 Appealing to the Court’s prior precedents, Justice
Breyer applied a fairness test, concluding that it would be unfair
to submit J. McIntyre to New Jersey’s jurisdiction, since J.
McIntyre did not have a “single contact with New Jersey short of
the machine in question ending up in this state.”172 To quote Justice
Breyer, “these facts do not provide contacts between [J. McIntyre]
and the State of New Jersey constitutionally sufficient to support
New Jersey’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case. None of our
precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied
by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient.”173
McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 879.
Id. at 886–87; Fatale, supra note 134, at 609–10.
168 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958)).
169 Id. at 886.
170 Id. Justice Kennedy admitted that J. McIntyre’s actions “may reveal an
intent to serve the U.S. market,” but in no way showed that “J. McIntyre
purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.” Id.
171 Id. at 893. Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer was unwilling “to announce a rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modernday consequences.” Id. at 887. Justice Breyer did not believe that McIntyre
presented “issues arising from recent changes in commerce and communication.” Id. at 875.
172 Id. at 886. There was no “‘regular ... flow’” of sales in New Jersey, nor
“‘something more,’ such as special state-related design, advertising, advice,
marketing, or anything else.” Id. at 889.
173 Id. at 888 (emphasis added).
166
167
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McIntyre’s holding is said to be limited in two ways. For one,
it was a splintered decision that failed to command a majority of
the Court.174 According to U.S. v. Marks,175 if the Justices agree
on the outcome of a judgment, but are split as to the reasoning,
the rule of the case is limited to the opinion in which five or more
Justices in support of the judgment concur.176 Because Justice
Breyer’s opinion iterated the Court’s prior precedents, that a
“single isolated sale” is insufficient to justify “an exercise of personal jurisdiction,”177 McIntyre’s precedential analysis is said to be
limited to Justice Breyer’s concurrence.178 Secondly, McIntyre concerned a foreign manufacturer who: (1) made a single sale to the
forum state; and (2) targeted the U.S. market as a whole and not
the markets of individual states.179 Although domestic manufacturers often engage in substantial “in-state marketing activity,”
the Justices explained that McIntyre’s reasoning is not limited to
foreign manufacturers and can be extended to domestic manufacturers, so long as they meet the above fact pattern.180 In the
realm of sales tax, such fact patterns are usually of little concern
to state tax officials since minimal tax revenue is at stake.181
However, the implementation of the MFA of 2015 would make
such fact patterns not only relevant, but also prevalent since it
authorizes states to force remote sellers, incurring above
$1,000,000 in total remote U.S. sales, to collect the sales and use
taxes of every state to which a purchase is sourced, regardless of
the volume of sales made to individual states and regardless of
where the remote sellers are “physically present.”182
Fatale, supra note 134, at 568, 608.
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
176 Fatale, supra note 134, at 616.
177 Robert M. Pollack, “Not of Any Particular State”: J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and Nonspecific Purposeful Availment, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1088, 1106 (2014).
178 Fatale, supra note 134, at 616.
179 McIntyre, 564 U.S. 885–86; Fatale, supra note 134, at 617–18.
180 Fatale, supra note 134, at 612, 618. Unlike brick and mortar businesses
whose “target market” generally does not extend past the boarders of the
states in which they are located, online sellers tend to “direct their products
towards consumers in all U.S. jurisdictions,” and may very well make only a
single sale to a certain jurisdiction. Bryan J. Soukup, Close The Loophole: The
Marketplace Fairness Act and its Likely Passage, INSIDE BASIS (Fed. Bar Ass’n
Section on Taxation), Fall 2013, at 16, 18–19.
181 Fatale, supra note 134, at 618.
182 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2015).
174
175
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As stated previously, Due Process requires that there be “some
definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and
the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax,”183 and that
the tax dollars received by the state be “rationally related” to the
state’s values.184 The relevant inquiry therefore, is whether the
individual’s contacts with the state “ma[k]e it reasonable”185 for
him to be required to submit to the state’s power and to serve as
the state’s “collection agent.”186 Although for different reasons, both
Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer agreed that it would be unreasonable for a remote seller to succumb to a state’s jurisdiction,
if the seller’s sole contact with the state consisted of a single
isolated sale made there.187 This view is not unique to McIntyre,
but has been expressed by the Court in other opinions. In Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, the Court had
“strongly suggested that a single sale of a product in a State does
not constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant, even if that defendant places his goods in
the stream of commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such a
sale will take place.”188 That is, the Court requires “something
more,” such as “‘the regular and anticipated flow’ of commerce
into the State.”189
The MFA of 2015 raises Due Process concerns in that it bases
a remote seller’s “minimum connection” to an individual state on
the remote seller’s “minimum connection” to the U.S. as a whole.190
This rationale is predicated on the idea that a remote seller who
incurs over $1,000,000 in gross annual receipts from total remote
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (quoting Miller
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)).
184 Id. at 306 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978)).
185 Id. at 298.
186 Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756–57 (1967); see also
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) (“The simple but controlling
question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.”).
187 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 888 (2011).
188 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 888–89 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 111–12
(1987)).
189 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 889 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Asahi, 480
U.S. at 111–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
190 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2015).
This is because the bill’s small seller threshold refers to a seller’s “total remote sales in the United States,” and not to sales in any one state. Id.
183
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sales191 has “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the [taxing] State[s], thus invoking the
benefits and protections of [their] laws,”192 and thus satisfying
the minimum connection required by the Due Process Clause.193
However, this rationale, in failing to account for the “volume” or
“value”194 of remote sales sourced to specific states, seemingly commits the fallacy of division.195 Take, for example, a Nebraska seller
who incurs $2,000,000 in total annual gross receipts from its remote
sales to New York and Virginia. Specifically, it made $1,000,000
from 100,000 sales to New York and $1,000,000 from 300,000 sales
to Virginia. It is clear from this example that the Nebraska seller
has “some definite link, some minimum connection”196 to both New
York and Virginia, based on its commercial activity in these
states, to warrant that it serve as “collection agent”197 for both
New York and Virginia.
But what if the facts were slightly changed and the Nebraska
seller incurred $100 from a single sale to New York and
$1,999,900 from 300,000 sales to Virginia? Despite McIntyre’s
holding, that “something more” than a single sale into a state is
needed to “constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction
over an out-of-state [seller],”198 the MFA of 2015 would dictate
the same result.199 Because the Nebraska seller exceeded the small
seller threshold, it could be forced to serve as “collection agent”
for both New York and Virginia, despite its single isolated sale of
nominal value to New York.200 The unfairness is glaring. The
MFA of 2015 essentially imputes the Nebraska seller’s Due Process nexus with Virginia to New York, assuming that what is
Id.
McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958)).
193 Id.
194 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (indicating that “the volume, the value, ...” of a good may affect the
jurisdictional inquiry and emphasizing Asahi’s “regular course of dealing”).
195 Fallacy of Division, LOGICALLY FALLACIOUS, https://www.logicallyfalla
cious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies/89/Fallacy_of_Division [https://perma.cc
/PEJ8-6QQC].
196 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 327 (1992) (quoting Miller
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)).
197 Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Rev., 386 U.S. 753, 756–57 (1967).
198 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 888–89.
199 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2015).
200 Id.
191
192
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true of the whole is also true of the parts,201 even though the
Nebraska seller had not “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [New York],” or enjoyed the
“benefits and protections of [New York’s] laws.”202 Furthermore,
this unfairness is amplified by the fact that the bill requires
“related” remote sellers (such a parent and its subsidiary) to aggregate their gross annual receipts when determining whether
they meet the small seller exception,203 making it even more
likely that one of the parties will lack the requisite “minimum
connection” with the taxing state.
b. Commerce Clause Analysis via Complete Auto
As stated previously, the Supreme Court developed the Complete
Auto test to determine whether a tax discriminates or unduly burdens interstate commerce.204 According to the Court, for a tax to
survive a “negative” Commerce Clause challenge, it must: (1) be applied to an activity with a “substantial nexus” with the taxing state;
(2) be “fairly apportioned”; (3) not “discriminate against interstate
commerce”; and (4) be “fairly related to the services provided by
the State.”205 As iterated in Bellas Hess and reaffirmed in Quill,
the “substantial nexus” requirement of the Commerce Clause
requires physical presence.206
See Fallacy of Division, supra note 195. The bill assumes that since the
Nebraska seller has the requisite connection to Virginia and New York combined,
that it has the requisite connection to both New York and Virginia separately—
based off of the Nebraska seller’s significant commercial activity in Virginia
and its single nominal sale to New York—this is clearly not the case. See id.
202 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958)).
203 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(c); Dion, supra
note 17.
204 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
205 Id.; Handel, supra note 111, at 628.
206 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311–15 (1992) (the Court decided
Quill based on the first prong of the Complete Auto test and reaffirmed the
holding of Bellas Hess; both Bellas Hess and the negative Commerce Clause create
a safe harbor for “vendors whose only connection with customers in the [taxing]
State is by common carrier or the United States mail”); Direct Mktg. Ass’n v.
Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1150–51 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the first prong of
the negative Commerce Clause requires physical presence, the court states, “It
is a fact—if an analytical oddity—that the Bellas Hess branch of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence guarantees a competitive benefit to certain firms
simply because of the organizational form they choose to assume.”).
201
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While the MFA of 2015 satisfies the second and third prongs,207
it fails to meet the first and fourth prongs, thereby failing the
Complete Auto test. In an attempt to “treat all sales transactions
equally,” the MFA of 2015 grants states “collection authority”208
over remote sellers regardless of where these sellers are physically
located.209 Thus, the MFA of 2015 violates the first prong as it eliminates Quill’s bright-line “physical presence” rule and replaces it
with “economic nexus.”210 The MFA of 2015 seemingly violates the
fourth prong as well, since it grants states “collection authority”
over remote sellers despite the fact that some, whether due to their
lack of physical or economic presence,211 receive no benefit from
the tax collection and have no voice in how the tax revenue is
spent.212 While many modern-day remote sellers, namely online
companies, tend to “direct their products towards consumers in
all U.S. jurisdictions,”213 it is highly unlikely that they receive
benefits from all fifty states in exchange for the sales and use tax
revenue they are required to collect and remit. For example, an
online seller who makes nominal remote sales to all 50 states exceeding the $1,000,000 threshold cannot be said to have benefitted
207 Prong two is satisfied because “the tax will be apportioned equally throughout each jurisdiction according to each state’s already established ... sales tax.”
Soukup, supra note 180, at 18–19. In order for a tax to “discriminate,” it must
treat “similarly situated” taxpayers differently, without “sufficient justification.”
Brohl, 814 F.3d at 1143 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 435
(1990)). Although the MFA of 2015 only applies to remote sales and has no effect
on intrastate sales, it treats all sellers (remote or nonremote) making remote sales
similarly. See Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 698, 114th Cong. §§ 2(a)–(b), 3(f)
(2015). Further, the bill specifies that a state cannot require a “remote seller to file
sales and use tax returns any more frequently than returns are required for
nonremote sellers or impose requirements on remote sellers that the State does
not impose on nonremote sellers.” Id. § 2(b). Thus, prong three is satisfied.
208 Dion, supra note 17. “Collection Authority” simply refers to the state’s
power to force the collection and remittance of its sales and use tax on purchases that are sourced to it. Id.
209 S. 698 §§ 2(a), 6(3); BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38.
210 S. 698 §§ 2(a), 4(3), 4(6)–(9). The MFA of 2015 grants states “collection authority” if the remote seller exceeds $1,000,000 in total remote sales. Id. § 2(c).
211 To restate the previous example, a remote Nebraska seller who incurs over
$1,000,000 in total gross annual receipts from a single sale to New York,
amounting to $100, and from 300,000 sales to Virginia, amounting to $1,999,900,
could be required to collect and remit both New York’s and Virginia’s sales and use
tax, despite its lack of economic presence in New York. See supra Part IV.A.3.a.
212 BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38.
213 Soukup, supra note 180, at 19.
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from each state’s fire and police protection, better-maintained
roads, and better public-maintained transportation systems.214
For the aforementioned reasons, the MFA of 2015 authorizes
state actions that would unduly burden interstate commerce.215
Yet, as iterated in Quill, Congress holds the “ultimate power” and
discretion to do so.216 Congress has, to no avail, considered several
pieces of legislation since Quill was decided that would ultimately
“overrule” its bright-line rule.217 It is not unreasonable to assume
that Congress decided against such legislation out of respect for
the Court’s holding in Bellas Hess, “that the Due Process Clause
prohibits States from imposing such taxes,”218 and out of respect
for a bright-line rule in general. Although Bellas Hess’s rule “appears artificial at its edges,” predicating the collection and remittance of a state’s sales and use tax on the “presence in the taxing
State of a small sales force, plant, or office,” the benefits of a clear
rule arguably outweigh any claims of artificiality;219 a brightline rule affords states a “precise guide” as to the boundaries of
their taxing authority, reduces state tax litigation by “encourag[ing] settled expectations,” and promotes investment.220 In
fact, some attribute the exponential growth of e-commerce at
least partly to Bellas Hess’s safe harbor.221
Although the MFA of 2015 appears to provide a “bright-line” rule
of its own—“economic nexus” as opposed to “physical presence”—the
bill is riddled with ambiguities. For example, “remote seller” is
broadly defined as “a person that makes remote sales in the
[s]tate.”222 Since the words “online,” “internet” or “web,” are not
214 Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 27, 46. Contrast this with brick and mortar
establishments who benefit directly from the tax revenue they collect and
remit on behalf of the state.
215 See supra notes 206–12 and accompanying text.
216 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992). Although the
Court reaffirmed Bellas Hess’s bright-line “physical presence” rule, it essentially invited Congress to legislate: “No matter how we evaluate the burdens
that use taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree
with our conclusions.” Id. The Court went on to say that Congress is “better
qualified to resolve” the issue of “whether, when, and to what extent the States
may burden interstate [sellers] with a duty to collect use taxes.” Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 315.
220 Id. at 315–16.
221 Id. at 316.
222 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 4(6) (2015).
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included in the definition,223 the bill presumably applies to more
than just online sellers; that is, brick and mortar businesses will
also fall under the definition.224 Similarly, the MFA of 2015 defines a “remote sale” as a “sale into a State ... in which the seller
would not legally be required to pay, collect, or remit State or local
sales and use taxes unless provided by this Act.”225 In other words,
it is a sale by a seller into a state with which the sellers lacks
nexus. While the Supreme Court has defined nexus to mean “physical presence,” such as the presence of an office or employees, many
states have aggressively expanded the Court’s rule to include a
“web-link or banner that sits on [a company’s] website.”226
V. ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS RAISED BY THE MFA
Despite its bipartisan support,227 the MFA of 2015 has raised
more than just Due Process and Commerce Clause concerns. For
one, even with full-fledged adoption of the SSUTA, member
states exhibit a significant lack of uniformity concerning their
sales and use taxes in various areas.228 Since the MFA of 2015
hinges on uniformity of sales and use tax laws,229 any divergence
is detrimental to the functional success of the bill. For example,
Georgia, a SSUTA member, passed legislation concerning resale
exemption certificate provisions230 that contradicts the SSUTA’s
Dion, supra note 17.
Id. Brick and mortar businesses support the MFA in hopes that it will
“level the playing field.” BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38. Yet, the
reality is that the bill’s scope encompasses more than just online sellers. It
grants states “collection authority” over all businesses (“such as Internet retailers
and out-of-state vendors, catalogue-based sellers, manufacturers/wholesalers,
B2B sellers, foreign remote sellers, and non-profit organizations”) who do not
qualify for the small seller exception and who make remote sales. KPMG, THINK
THE MARKETPLACE FAIRNESS ACT IS NOT YOUR REALITY? THINK AGAIN. 2 (2014).
225 S. 698 § 4(5) (emphasis added).
226 Dion, supra note 17. New York’s “Amazon Taxes” are a perfect example.
See id.; see also Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 26.
227 Marketplace Fairness Act Compliance, TAXCLOUD, http://marketplace
fairness.org/support/ [https://perma.cc/WA86-ZRBJ].
228 Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 47.
229 BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38; S. 698 § 2(b). States can
only force remote sellers to collect and remit the applicable sales and use
taxes if they simplify, or streamline, their sales and use taxes. Id. § 2(b)–(c).
230 H.B. 266, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Ga. 2013) (amending GA.
CODE ANN. § 48-8-38).
223
224
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standard concerning these provisions.231 Although the SSUTA’s
standard exonerates a seller from collection responsibility if the
seller presents a valid resale exemption certificate, under Georgia’s
new “good faith” standard, the seller is only exonerated if the
seller exercises due diligence.232
Secondly, the MFA of 2015 is expected to negatively impact
small businesses (both online and brick and mortars alike) by forcing them to allocate their time and resources towards compliance
issues instead of towards job creation.233 Streamlining sales and
use taxes is neither an easy nor inexpensive process.234 In fact, most
large retailers employ entire teams of outside advisors dedicated
to sales tax compliance.235 Most small businesses are already
bogged down by “Federal and State tax systems that are too complex, too time consuming, and too costly to comply with,” and simply
cannot afford to hire outside advisors, or to implement new taxcompliance software systems.236 Although the bill requires states to
provide remote sellers with software, free of charge, that calculates
the appropriate “sales and use taxes due on each transaction ... that
files sales and use tax returns, and that is updated to reflect rate
changes,”237 there still remain significant costs to be borne by the
seller.238 For example, sellers will likely have to revamp their IT
Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 47.
Id.
233 See 159 CONG. REC. S. 2827–31 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2013) (statement of
Sen. Wyden).
234 Id.
235 See, e.g., Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 47.
236 159 Cong. Rec. S. 2827–31 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2013) (statement of Sen.
Wyden).
237 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(a)(ii) (2014).
238 See, e.g., id. There are also ambiguities as to how exactly the free software provision will work, and the meaning of “free of charge.” KPMG, supra
note 224, at 4. Congresswoman Collins uses athletic apparel as an example of
the complexity involved:
In some States, clothing and athletic footwear are exempt from
tax. In others, they are exempt only up to a certain price level.
Yet other States make a distinction between clothing and footwear used for athletic purposes—which they tax—and clothing
and footwear used for general purposes—which they do not
tax. In those States, systems must be programmed to correctly
treat articles that can be viewed as either athletic apparel or
general clothing, depending on the user. Board shorts, sneakers,
231
232
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infrastructure in order to implement and integrate the new tax
compliance software with their “existing billing, purchasing, and
back-end technology.”239 For “multichannel retailers,” those who
sell “online, through catalogs, over the phones, and in stores,”
with unique order processing systems, this means that the new
software must be “programmed to link to each component of
their order processing systems,” which would be both costly and
time-consuming.240 In addition, sellers would need to research
the sales and use tax policies of every state in which they have
customers, to ensure that they have programed their tax collection software correctly.241 Thus, although sellers would be given
the software “free of charge” the many hidden expenses make it
seemingly impossible for small businesses to maintain the level
of compliance required by the MFA of 2015,242 suggesting that
the small seller threshold be increased to $50 million.243
Third, the MFA of 2015 gives the states “carte blanche” to
impose more taxes on businesses.244 Currently, states that cannot
legally require remote sellers to collect their sales tax rely on
purchasers themselves to report and pay a compensating use tax.245
However, since the MFA gives states the power to force remote
and windbreakers are just a few examples of common items that
give rise to substantial complexity.
159 CONG. REC. S. 3081, 3083 (daily ed. May 6, 2013) (statement of Sen. Collins).
239 KPMG, supra note 224, at 4.
240 159 CONG. REC. S. 3081–83 (daily ed. May 6, 2013) (statement to Sen.
Collins).
241 See, e.g., id.
242 Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 47; Catherine Chen, Taxation of Digital
Goods and Services, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 421, 444 (arguing that “compliance burdens of ascertaining the correct withholding rates would create an unfair
disadvantage for small businesses because of the constantly evolving laws of
the forty-five taxing states and hundreds of localities”). While large online retailers
such as Netflix and Amazon would be subject to the same compliance regulations
under the MFA of 2015, their costs would not be as burdensome due to their
“economies of scale.” Id. These companies can not only afford to comply with
the MFA of 2015, but would be benefitted from its implementation since the
high costs of complying with the bill are likely to shut down, or at the very
least hurt, their smaller competitors. Carroll, supra note 109.
243 Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 47.
244 159 CONG. REC. S. 2827, 2829 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2013) (statement of Sen.
Baucus).
245 See, e.g., ERIKA K. LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43800, TAXATION
OF INTERNET SALES AND ACCESS: LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2015).
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sellers to “play tax collector,” there is an incentive for states to
increase the variety of items that are taxable, as well as their
sales tax rates.246 To quote Congressman Baucus, “This bill is going
to make it very desirable for States to start taxing and collecting on
all sorts of services—not just the financial world but also on services
provided by attorneys, architects, engineers, and accountants.”247
Lastly, with the passage of the MFA of 2015, it is argued that
consumers will pay an additional $22 billion in sales taxes.248
Although the MFA calls for “no new taxes,”249 it allows states to
enforce the collection of sales and use taxes that would have otherwise gone uncollectible and unenforceable.250 Thus, although not
literally prescribing a “new tax,” the additional tax revenue that will
be generated by MFA of 2015 is “money that is going to come out of
the pockets of American families that has not come out of their
pockets before.”251 Consumers, as a result, will be less likely to
shop online and the internet economy will bear the repercussions.252
CONCLUSION
The MFA of 2015, no doubt, raises Due Process, Commerce
Clause, and administrative concerns. In terms of Due Process,
the MFA will likely pass constitutional muster in a majority of
situations, where a remote seller has made significant sales to
the taxing state. However, there are fact patterns that shed
light on the bill’s fundamental unfairness; for example, where a
remote seller is required to submit to a state’s jurisdiction, despite its single isolated sale there of nominal value. The bill also
159 CONG. REC. S. 2827, 2828 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2013) (statement of
Sen. Baucus).
247 Id. at 2829.
248 Id. at 2828.
249 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(e) (2015).
250 See 159 CONG. REC. S. 2827, 2829 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2013) (statement of
Sen. Baucus).
251 Id.
252 See id. Additional causes for concern include: (1) the bill fails to establish a singular audit system, thereby exposing businesses to audits by all 50
states; (2) the bill fails to establish rules for dispute resolution; and (3) the bill
“tramples” on a state’s decision not to enact a sales tax. For example, Indiana
could force a New Hampshire seller to collect and remit its sales and use tax
on sales sourced to Indiana, even though the state of New Hampshire has decided against implementing a sales tax of its own. Id. at 2829–30.
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raises Commerce Clause concerns by substituting “economic nexus”
for “physical presence.” Since Congress has the plenary power to
authorize state violations of the Commerce Clause, though not of
the Due Process Clause, the question becomes, should it?
If enacted, there are multiple administrative hurdles that the
MFA will have to overcome. But if forgone, more and more
states are likely to hop aboard the “click-through” and “affiliate”
nexus bandwagons,253 putting Congress in a bind. Is it possible
to pass a piece of legislation to grant states the authority they so
wish—to force the collection of remote sales and use taxes—
without “overruling” Quill’s bright-line physical presence rule?254
A look at Colorado’s statute, which imposes reporting obligations
on remote retailers, answers this question in the affirmative.
Under Colorado’s law, remote retailers, who do not qualify for a
small seller exception,255 must: (1) provide transactional notices
to Colorado purchasers, informing them that the retailer “has
not collected sales or use tax,” that the purchase “is not exempt
from Colorado sales or use tax,” and that “Colorado law requires
the purchaser to file a sales or use tax return and to pay tax
owed;”256 (2) send “annual purchase summaries” to Colorado customers whose remote purchases exceed $500, informing them of
their duty to “file a sales or use tax return at the end of every
year;”257 and (3) send annual “customer information report[s]” to
the Department, which list “purchasers’ names, billing addresses,
shipping addresses, and total purchase amounts,”258 informing
the Department of taxpayers who failed to pay the tax, so that it
can pursue audit and collection actions against these taxpayers.
Such a statute allows states to enforce use tax compliance without
HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 11.
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 299 (1992).
255 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 201-1:39-21-112.3.5(1)(a)(iii) (2010). “For purposes of
this regulation, the Department will presume that a retailer that makes less than
$100,000 in total gross sales in Colorado in the prior calendar year and reasonably expects total gross sales in Colorado in the current calendar year will
be less than $100,000 is a retailer whose sales in Colorado are de minimis.” Id.
256 Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 735 F.3d 904, 907, 907–08 (10th Cir. 2013)
(citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(c)(I); 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 2011:39-21-112.3.5(2)).
257 Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(I); 1 COLO. CODE REGS.
§ 201-1:39-21-112.3.5(3)).
258 Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(II); 1 COLO. CODE REGS.
§ 201-1:39-21-112.3.5(4)).
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stepping on the toes of Quill or the Constitution,259 since Quill
only applies to collection requirements and not to reporting requirements.260 Thus, instead of enacting the MFA of 2015, legislation that will surely muddy the waters of an already complex
tax system, Congress should consider enacting national reporting requirements. Such would ensure that Quill’s “precedential
island would never expand but would, if anything, wash away
with the tides of time,” making everyone happy.261

Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1146–47 (10th Cir. 2016)
(holding that the “Colorado Law does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause
because it does not discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce”).
260 Id. at 1146. “Quill does not establish that out-of-state retailers are free
from all regulatory requirements—only tax collection and liability.” Id. at
1145. This is true even if the sole purpose of the state’s reporting statute is to
enhance use tax collection. Id.
261 Id. at 1151.
259

